Abstract
The situation of the Orthodox church(es) of Russia and Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine in February, 2022, is extremely complex. In Ukraine, one branch of the church claims autocephaly (not recognized by the Moscow Patriachate, within the “canonical territory” of which lie all the East-Slavic lands, although recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarch), while another remains, albeit uncomfortably, affiliated with Moscow. Meanwhile, in Russia, priests who pray for “peace” rather than “victory”, as stated in the Patriarch’s prayer for “Holy Rus’” (not, note, a modern geopolitical entity, but a medievalist recreation) are sanctioned. In the Chief Cathedral of the Armed Forces, consecrated in 2020 just outside of Moscow, one mural initially depicted the current President of the Russian Federation, associated explicitly with the 2014 annexation of Ukraine, while Joseph Stalin was also present in another (although both were subsequently removed). In Ukraine, prelates suspected of Russian sympathies are arrested, tried, and punished; icons of such “Russian” (that is, medieval Rus’) warrior saints as Alexander Nevsky, 1221-1263, are removed from churches, while contemporary icons are painted on discarded ammunition boxes. As with the war itself, so with the overwhelming predominant confession of the East Slavs, the way forward is far from clear. This paper explores the interaction of Orthodox and politics in the East Slavic lands, paying particular attention to the most acute and painful pressure points in the church(es) today and speculating on what comes next.
Presenters
Michael MakinProfessor, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Michigan, Michigan, United States
Details
Presentation Type
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session
Theme
KEYWORDS
Orthodoxy, Russia, Ukraine, War
